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Is The Trial Deposition of an Expert Really Just
an Interview?
INTRODUCTION
The trial deposition' has become an integral part of the litiga-
tion system due to the increasing employment of national experts,
and the uncertainty of trial dates and witness availability. To ac-
commodate and control this environment, the Pennsylvania legis-
lature has promulgated a rule of civil procedure to govern the use
of trial depositions in state courts.2 The advent of videotaped trial
depositions has also led to escalation in the use of trial depositions
since videotape captures the demeanor and appearance of wit-
nesses and alleviates jurors from the boredom usually associated
with listening to a reading of a written trial deposition.3
In two cases recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court was con-
fronted with issues regarding the proper use of trial depositions at
trial.' In these two decisions, the superior court ignored the plain
language of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and, in
turn, has fostered a misuse of trial depositions and added ineffi-
ciency to the litigation system. The following hypothetical illus-
trates this misuse:
A physician, Dr. X, was sued by Mrs. Y for medical malpractice. Mrs. Y's
attorney hired Dr. Z to evaluate the claim. After a favorable evaluation of
the plaintiff's claim, her attorney decided to hire Dr. Z as an expert to tes-
tify at trial. Due to Dr. Z's busy schedule and the uncertainty of trial dates,
the attorney set up a date to videotape trial deposition of Dr. Z and show it
at trial, in lieu of live testimony. The defendant's attorney prepared dili-
gently for his cross-examination of Dr. Z. At the deposition Dr.Z's testimony
was not very persuasive; in fact, the defendant's attorney elicited some re-
sponses favorable to the defendant. The plaintiff's attorney also took the
trial depositions of four other physicians who had treated Mrs. Y. Instead of
presenting Dr. Z's deposition at trial, the plaintiff's attorney decided to
forego using Dr. Z's deposition. The plaintiff's attorney also failed to pre-
1. A trial deposition is testimony to be presented at trial, so far as relevant and
competent, as though the witness were present in court.
2. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4020.
3. See, M. Belli, 4 Modern Trials 59.1 (West, 2d ed 1982).
4. Pascone v Thomas Jefferson University, 357 Pa Super 524, 516 A2d 384 (1986);
Smith v Barker, 368 Pa Super 472, 534 A2d 533 (1987).
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sent two of the four treating physicians' depositions. At trial the defendant
sought to present cross-examination testimony from the trial depositions of
Dr. Z and the two treating physicians whose depositions were not presented,
but the court refused.
The question posed by the hypothetical is whether the defend-
ant's attorney can present cross-examination testimony from trial
depositions which were scheduled and taken by plaintiff's attorney
if plaintiff's attorney fails to present testimony from the deposi-
tions. The answer to this question in Pennsylvania is no, which, in
turn, has led to a wasteful use of trial depositions.
The Pennsylvania attorney is very aware of the fact that if a
trial deposition does not turn out quite to his liking, he can essen-
tially exclude that deposition in its entirety from presentment in
court and can schedule another trial deposition of another expert,
or can call the original witness live. The Pennsylvania Superior
Court's holdings have basically turned the trial deposition into an
interviewing session, where the scheduling attorney determines
whether the deponent would make a good witness.
THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPERIOR COURT
In Pascone v Thomas Jefferson University,5 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court faced the issue of whether the trial court correctly
denied the plaintiffs' introduction of videotaped cross-examination
from a trial deposition of the defendant's expert, when the defend-
ants failed to present the deposition during their case.6 The de-
fendant hospital had retained Dr. Smith to give his expert medical
opinion regarding the standards of medical care during the 1960s.7
Unsure of whether Dr. Smith would be available during trial, coun-
sel for the hospital had Dr. Smith's trial deposition taken and re-
corded by videotape approximately two and one-half weeks before
the scheduled trial date.6 The videotaped deposition included
cross-examination by the plaintiffs' attorney, who, by asking Dr.
Smith to assume certain hypothetical facts, had been able to ex-
tract certain answers that the plaintiffs believed would be helpful
in showing that the hospital physicians had been negligent.' In
support of their motion to admit the cross-examination testimony
5. 357 Pa Super 524, 516 A2d 384 (1986).
6. Pascone, 516 A2d at 385.
7. Id at 386.
8. Id.
9. Id. Dr. Smith's direct testimony had been supportive of the defense's view of the
case and had not been even arguably favorable to the plaintiffs' case. Id at 386, n.2.
314 Vol. 29:313
Comments
at trial, plaintiffs argued that because the hospital had deposed Dr.
Smith for the sole purpose of using his testimony at trial, the trial
had actually commenced upon the taking of his deposition, and
therefore, Dr. Smith's testimony was already in evidence."0
The trial court ruled that plaintiffs could not use the answers
extracted from Dr. Smith for the following reasons: (1) the answers
had been premised upon hypothetical facts which had not been
proved during trial; (2) the testimony that plaintiffs wished to pre-
sent to the jury had been elicited by the use of leading and sugges-
tive questions, which, if Dr. Smith were to become plaintiffs' wit-
ness, would be objectionable; and (3) Dr. Smith had refused to
testify as a witness for the plaintiffs so that permitting the plain-
tiffs to use his deposition would be tantamount to forcing him to
testify against his will."
On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania declared that the
admissibility of videotaped depositions is governed by Rule 4017.1
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in perti-
nent part:
(n) Any deposition taken upon oral examination may be recorded by
videotape. Except as provided by this rule, the rules of this chapter gov-
erning the practice and procedure in depositions and discovery shall
apply.
(g) In addition to the uses permitted by Rule 4020 a videotape deposition
of a medical witness or any witness called as an expert, other than a party,
may be used at trial for any purpose whether or not the witness is available
to testify."
The court then noted that Pennsylvania Rule 4020, in pertinent
part, provides:
(a) At the trial, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissable under
the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or
represented at the taking of the deposition or who had notice thereof if re-
quired, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:
(5) A deposition upon oral examination of a medical witness, other than a
party, may be used at trial for any purpose whether or not the witness is
10. Id at 386. The plaintiffs also argued that the answers elicited from Dr. Smith
during cross-examination contradicted the trial testimony of Dr. Beck who the hospital ulti-
mately decided to have testify at trial as an expert regarding the pertinent standard of care
during the 1960s. Plaintiffs submitted, therefore, that Dr. Smith's testimony should be re-
ceived for purposes of rebutting Dr. Beck's testimony. Id.
11. Id.




Notably, the court did not emphasize the words "may be used at
trial for any purpose."
The superior court then held that the evidentiary ruling of the
trial court must be affirmed if correct for any reason."' The court
noted, "It is well settled that the admission of expert testimony is
a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose deci-
sion will not be reversed unless the court clearly abused that dis-
cretion."'1 Consequently, the superior court declared that the first
two reasons given by the trial court had enough merit to affirm the
ruling.' 6 First, the Pascone court asserted that a question assuming
a fact not proved or admitted into evidence is improper and should
be excluded. 17 Since the plaintiffs failed to prove many of the as-
sumed facts underlying the hypothetical questions asked of Dr.
Smith on cross-examination, the appellate court concluded that
the trial court properly excluded the testimony derived from these
factually unsupported hypothetical questions. 8 This portion of the
Pascone decision represents a sound evidentiary principle which is
uncontested.
The superior court's affirmation of the trial court's second rea-
son, on the other hand, is troubling. The Pascone court noted that
although the plaintiffs wanted the jury to hear their cross-exami-
nation of Dr. Smith, they were making him their own witness when
they offered into evidence his deposition testimony."e As the plain-
tiffs' witness, the court held that Dr. Smith could not testify by
way of leading questions.'0 Since a review of Dr. Smith's deposition
revealed unequivocally that the questions asked of him on cross-
examination were hypothetical in form and were, by their nature,
suggestive and leading, the court ruled that the trial court was cor-
13. Id (emphasis added).
14. Id at 386. See, E.J. McAleer & Co. v Iceland Products, Inc., 475 Pa 610, 613, n 4,
381 A2d 441, 443, n 4 (1977); Gwinn v Kane, 465 Pa 269, 279, n 12, 348 A2d 900, 905, n 12
(1975).
15. Pascone, 516 A2d at 386. See, Pirches v General Accident Insurance Co., 354 Pa
Super 303, 511 A2d 1349 (1986).
16. Pascone, 516 A2d at 388.
17. Id at 387. See, 98 C J S Witnesses § 341; Kirschman v Pitt Publishing Co., 318 Pa
570, 574, 178 A 828, 829 (1935).
18. Pascone, 516 A2d at 388.
19. Id. See, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4020(d).
20. Id. The court held that since Dr. Smith could not testify in open court for a party
calling him as a witness by way of leading questions, he could not do so by way of a deposi-
tion. See, Rogan Estate, 404 Pa 205, 214, 171 A2d 177, 181 (1961). Pascone, 516 A2d at 388.
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rect in excluding the offered testimony."'
Although the Pascone court managed to indicate the pertinent
rules of civil procedure, it ignored the plain meaning of those same
rules. Pennsylvania Rule 4017.1(g) states that "a videotape deposi-
tion of a medical witness or any witness called as an expert, other
than a party, may be used at trial for any purpose whether or not
the witness is available to testify." Rule 4020(a)(5) provides that
"A deposition upon oral examination of a medical witness, other
than a party, may be used at trial for any purpose whether or not
the witness is available to testify." Both rules use the words "may
be used at trial for any purpose." The language in these rules is
clear, unambiguous and incapable of any meaning other than that
either party may use deposition testimony of experts or medical
witnesses, regardless of which party scheduled the deposition, as
long as the testimony is admissable under the rules of evidence.
Since all trial depositions contain, or could contain, cross-examina-
tion, the legislature obviously exempted Rules 4017.1(g) and
4020(a)(5) from the prohibition against the admission of testimony
on direct examination by leading questions. Otherwise, there is lit-
tle reason for the enactment of these two rules of civil procedure.
Pennsylvania case law also supports such a reading of the words
"for any purpose." In Flynn v City of Chester,22 the appellant ar-
gued to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that it was error for the
trial judge to refuse to admit into evidence the appellee's deposi-
tion.23 Noting that the plain language of Rule 4020(a)(2) states
that "The deposition of a party . . . may be used by an adverse
party for any purpose," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the trial court was in error.24 The deposition" presumably
contained testimony derived by leading questions, but the supreme
court, seemingly unconcerned, instead applied the plain meaning
of Rule 4020(a)(2)." Since the language in Rule 4020(a)(2) is the
same as in Rules 4020(a)(5) and 4017.1(g), the Pascone court's fail-
ure to give either Rule 4020(a)(5) or 4017.1(g) the same meaning
and application was erroneous.
21. Pascone, 516 A2d at 388.
22. 429 Pa 170, 239 A2d 322 (1968).
23. Flynn, 239 A2d at 323.
24. Id at 324 (emphasis added).
25. The deposition in question was most likely a discovery deposition where most if
not the entire deposition would have been conducted by leading questions.
26. Flynn, 239 A2d at 324. See, Stambaugh v Reed, 86 Cmwlth Ct 316, 484 A2d 853
(1984), where the Commonwealth Court held that a party may use the deposition of an
adverse party for any purpose at trial.
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The Pascone court's ruling holds, in effect, that if the scheduling
party fails to introduce the deposition, the cross-examining party
can only introduce testimony from the direct examination since
that is the only part not containing leading questions. Surely, the
Pennsylvania Legislature did not intend an application this narrow
of Rules 4017.1(g) and 4020(a)(5). Although a party may not ques-
tion his own witness by leading questions at trial, the trial deposi-
tion is not trial. Furthermore, the deponent is neither party's wit-
ness at the trial deposition. Nevertheless, the trial deposition has
to be conducted in a trial-like manner since its purpose is for the
scheduling party to present the deposition in its entirety during his
case-in-chief. The scheduling party's intention to use the deponent
as his witness dictates the roles of direct and cross examiner; a
misjudgment about the deponent should be to the detriment of the
scheduling party, not the opposing party. This detriment to the
scheduling party should enable the nonscheduling party to intro-
duce on direct examination deposition testimony derived by lead-
ing questions. If the scheduling party had instead called the depo-
nent as a live witness in court, the scheduling party would have to
live with that testimony for better or worse. Unfortunately, a deci-
sion by the scheduling party not to use the deponent's testimony
essentially excludes the whole deposition.
The Pascone court did not agree with the third reason advanced
by the trial court, namely, that to allow plaintiffs to use Dr.
Smith's testimony would, in effect, force him to testify against his
will.2 The superior court noted that although Dr. Smith may have
believed that he was giving testimony as a defense witness, the rec-
ord disclosed that he was giving testimony via deposition for use at
trial and that all or part of his testimony could be used for that
purpose.2 8
The superior court also found no merit in the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that trial had commenced when Dr. Smith's deposition was
taken.2' In refuting this argument, the court stated that such a
conclusion would be in direct contradiction to Rule 4020(d) which
provides: "A party shall not be deemed to make a person his own
witness for any purpose by taking his deposition. The introduction
in evidence of the deposition or any part thereof . . makes the
deponent the witness of the party introducing the deposition [at
27. Pascone, 516 A2d at 386.
28. Id.
29. Id at 388.
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trial]. ''8° The court, therefore, held that Dr. Smith's deposition was
not in evidence prior to the commencement of trial proceedings.8 '
One year later the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Smith v
Barker, 3 reportedly relying on the Pascone holding, upheld a trial
court's ruling that allowed the defendant to prevent the plaintiff
from presenting cross-examination testimony from a videotaped
trial deposition of the plaintiffs expert. The superior court also
affirmed the trial court's ruling that permitted the defendant to
withhold presentation of two other videotaped trial depositions
prepared by the defendant.38 Unlike the comparatively lengthy
reasoning given in Pascone, the Smith court merely stated that a
finding opposite to the trial court's would be in "direct contradic-
tion to Pa.R.C.P. 4020(d)."' ' Interestingly, the Pascone court used
those same words, "direct contradiction to Pa.R.C.P. 4020(d)."
However, there the court used them in response only to the ques-
tion of whether the trial commenced at the taking of the deposi-
tion.8 The Smith court clearly misapplied the Pascone holding
since in Smith there was no question as to when the trial com-
menced. The Pascone court simply held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in deciding not to admit the cross-examination
of Dr. Smith, since the testimony was based on hypothetical and
leading questions. The Smith court, on the other hand, never eval-
uated the testimony for such problems. The Smith court incor-
rectly interpreted Rule 4020(d), a literal reading of which clearly
indicates that the introduction by either party of trial deposition
testimony is permissable. 8 Rule 4020(d) contemplates that any
party can introduce any portion of a deposition by stating that the
deponent becomes the witness of the party introducing the
30. Id at 389.
31. Id.
32. 368 Pa Super 472, 534 A2d 533 (1987).
33. Smith, 534 A2d at 535. The superior court affirmed the trial court's decision to
allow the defendant not to present the video depositions prepared by the defendant of Drs.
Cook and Simon. Id.
34. Id.
35. Pascone, 516 A2d at 388.
36. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4020(d) provides:
A party shall not be deemed to make a person his own witness for any purpose by
taking his deposition. The introduction in evidence of the deposition or any part
thereof for any purpose other than that of contradicting or impeaching the deponent
makes the deponent the witness of the party introducing the deposition, but this
shall not apply to the use by an adverse party of a deposition as described in subdivi-
sion (a)(2) of this rule. At trial or hearing any party may rebut any relevant evidence




Although both the Pascone and Smith decisions involved video-
taped depositions of medical witnesses, neither decision applied
Rule 4017.1(g) or 4020(a)(5). These rules specifically state that the
deposition "may be used at trial for any purpose." These rules
were not meant to be restricted by the prohibition against an at-
torney at trial leading his own witness. In enacting Rules 4017.1(g)
and 4020(a)(5), the Pennsylvania Legislature apparently recog-
nized the importance and prevalence of expert trial depositions,
and was aware of their misuse in the form of expert-shopping.
Hence, the legislature drafted these rules presumably to make the
trial deposition of an expert equivalent to a deposition of a party.
Logic suggests that the expert trial deposition was meant to be
used sparingly and after careful consideration.
In light of the foregoing, an examination of how two other courts
have allowed parties to use expert trial depositions at trial is
enlightening.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (EASTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA)
In Reber v General Motors Corp., s the plaintiffs presented post-
trial motions89 following a jury trial which ended in a defense ver-
dict. The plaintiffs contended that the court erred in permitting
the defendants to use a videotaped trial deposition of a witness
whom the plaintiffs alleged was available to testify in court as a
live witness.40 Just prior to the trial date, plaintiffs took a video-
tape trial deposition of Dr. Charles McCrae, an orthopedic surgeon
who treated Mr. Reber for impingement syndrome.' Dr. McCrae
was not expected to be within one hundred miles of the courthouse
at the time of trial; however, the doctor had returned by the time
the defendants proposed to use the deposition at trial.'2 Plaintiffs,
37. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4020(d).
38. 669 F Supp 717 (E D Pa 1987).
39. The post-trial motions were for a judgment n.o.v. or a new trial. Reber, 669 F
Supp at 719.
40. Id. This was a products liability action in which the plaintiffs alleged that the cab
of the tractor-trailer Mr. Reber was in was not "crashworthy." The accident resulted in a
severe injury to Mr. Reber's shoulder when he allegedly contacted an air-conditioning unit
inside the cab after the truck jackknifed on an icy road. Id at 718.
41. Id at 719. The court defined impingement syndrome as a compression of the rota-
tor cuff between the shoulder blade and the upper arm bone. Id.
42. Id at 720. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(3) provides that "The deposition
of a witness, whether not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court
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in the meantime, had decided to forego the doctor's testimony en-
tirely.'3 During the deposition cross-examination of Dr. McCrae,
defendants' counsel asked the doctor to describe the cause of the
primary injury alleged to have resulted from the accident." Dr.
McCrae replied that the injury occurred as a result of falling on an
outstretched arm.'5 Since Dr. McCrae's causation opinion differed
from the one expressed by the physician who testified for the
plaintiffs at trial, the defendants used Dr. McCrae's trial deposi-
tion as part of their evidence to negate the plaintiffs' theory of
causation."
Plaintiffs contended at trial, and in post-trial motions, that the
court should have compelled the defendants to produce Dr. Mc-
Crae for live testimony since it was established that he was within
the 100-mile area.' Defendants argued that the doctor should not
be compelled to appear in court after the trial deposition had been
taken and that it was understood that he would have no further
obligation to testify.4' After an "in camera" view of the tape, the
court permitted the videotape to be shown to the jury during the
defendants' case since there were special circumstances, namely,
Dr. McCrae's busy schedule following his return and the admitted
expectation that the videotape would, when filmed, be used at
trial." Notably, similar circumstances are almost always said to be
present by scheduling attorneys when expert trial depositions are
arranged. Still, the trial court concluded that these considerations
warranted the deposition's use in the interest of justice and judi-
cial economy, as permitted by federal Rule 32(a)(3)(E). Upon
consideration of the post-trial motions, the district court held that
the use of the deposition was proper under the circumstances and
placed particular importance on the fact that the parties had un-
conditionally agreed to present the doctor's testimony by means of
videotape at trial."1 The court asserted that although live testi-
finds:. . . (B) that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial
or hearing. .. "
43. Reber, 669 F Supp at 720.
44. Id. The primary injury alleged to have occurred was a rotator cuff tear. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. When contacted by the defendants, the doctor indicated that he was not




51. Id. The court noted that had the doctor been unavailable under rule 32(a)(3)(E),
plaintiffs could have no basis for objecting to defendants' use of the videotaped testimony at
1991
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mony has traditionally been preferred to trial deposition testi-
mony, the videotaped deposition is distinguishable in that video
allows the jury to observe and hear both parties question the wit-
ness, just as in trial."
The plaintiffs' principal complaint was that Dr. McCrae, who be-
came the defendants' witness by their introduction of his testi-
mony at trial, was examined by the defendants through leading
questions." However, the district court found this complaint un-
persuasive and maintained that the parties understood that the
witness would testify with all objections made and preserved for
ruling at trial." The court further explained that when plaintiffs'
counsel heard the adverse testimony, he could then have declared
the witness hostile and proceeded as if on cross-examination."
Since the plaintiffs did not avail themselves of this protection, the
court held that the plaintiffs could not pursue such protection by
way of post-trial relief and, therefore, denied plaintiffs' motions."
OHIO
In Cook v Krause, the defendant, Uniroyal, claimed that the
trial court committed prejudicial error by not allowing them to
read and introduce into evidence a deposition containing cross-ex-
amination testimony of plaintiff's attending orthopedic surgeon."
The defendant based its claim of error upon Ohio Rule 32(A)(3),
which provides that "The deposition of a witness, whether or not a
party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds:
(e) that the witness is an attending physician or medical ex-
pert, although residing in the county in which the action is
heard."' 9
The court of appeals looked to the plain language of Rule 32
trial, nor could they have complained had the defendants compelled the doctor's live testi-
mony. Feingold v SEPTA, 339 Pa Super 15, 488 A2d 284 (1985).
52. Reber, 669 F Supp at 720. See, M. Belli, Modern Trials, §59.1 (2d ed 1982); 23
AM JUR TRIALS 95, § 15; Morrill, Enter-The Video Tape Trial, INS L J 406, 411 (1970).
53. Reber, 669 F Supp at 720.
54. Id at 721.
55. Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 611(c).
56. Reber, 669 F Supp at 721.
57. Appeal No 18852, slip op at 10 ([OH] Court of Appeals of Ohio, May 5, 1978).
58. Cook, slip op at 11. The defendant, Uniroyal, also claimed that the trial court
committed prejudicial error by not allowing defendant to comment in closing argument
upon plaintiff's failure to offer the deposition testimony of the attending orthopedic sur-
geon. Id.
59. Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 32(A)(3).
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(A)(3)(e) and held the trial court's action was indeed erroneous.10
Notably, Ohio Rule 32(A)(3), like Pennsylvania Rules 4017.1(g)
and 4020(a)(5), contains the words "may be used by any party for
any purpose." Recognizing that the introduction of only certain se-
lected portions of a deposition gives rise to the possibility that wit-
nesses' statements will be taken out of context (or over-empha-
sized), the court declared that Rule 32 (A)(4) specifically provides
a safety device whereby a party can require the offering party to
also introduce any other relevant portions of the deposition. 6'
Pennsylvania has an identical rule of civil procedure. That rule
states: "If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a
party, any other party may require him to introduce all of it which
is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce
any other parts."62 Accordingly, the Ohio court of appeals found
the trial court in error for refusing to permit the introduction of
cross-examination testimony of plaintiff's attending orthopedic
surgeon.63 The Cook decision illustrates a plain meaning applica-
tion of the Ohio rules of civil procedure.
CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania Superior Court's holdings in Pascone and
Smith violate the plain meaning-and spirit of the controlling rules
of civil procedure. The holdings also foster a wasteful use of trial
depositions which adds to the inefficiency of the litigation system.
The trial deposition was created for a witness unable to attend the
courtroom proceedings. However, the trial deposition has become
an instrument where a lawyer can create a witness bank from
which to choose the best witnesses. Just call it witness-shopping.
The way to reduce this abuse is to allow both parties to admit tes-
timony from expert trial depositions. Lawyers will then be more
careful before scheduling trial depositions and will prepare more
diligently for them.
On the other hand, trial depositions, when taken, should not be
forced to be shown in their entirety or even at all. That would be
unduly restrictive, uneconomical, and not within the current scope
of the Pennsylvania rules of civil procedure. The suggestion here is
60. Cook, slip op at 11.
61. Id. See, Moore, Federal Practice, Section 32.06. Id.
62. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4020(a)(4).
63. Cook, slip op at 12. See, Clayton County Board of Education v Hooper, 128 GA
817, 198 SE2d 373 (1973), where, although not contested, the defendant placed certain dep-
osition testimony of the plaintiff's treating physician into evidence.
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simply that the courts adhere to the standing rules of civil proce-
dure-the plain language of the rules.
John T. Hinton
